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ABSTRACT
Effective local government taxation is critical to achieving the governance
benefits widely attributed to decentralization, but in practice successful tax
reform has been rare because of entrenched political resistance. This article
offers new insights into the political dynamics of property tax reform through
a case study of Sierra Leone, focusing on variation in experiences and out-
comes across the country’s four largest city councils. Based on this evidence,
the article argues that elite resistance has posed a particularly acute barrier to
local government tax reform, but that ethnic diversity has sometimes served
to strengthen reform by fragmenting elite resistance. Furthermore, oppos-
ition councils have had stronger incentives to strengthen tax collection than
councils dominated by the ruling party, in order to increase their fiscal auton-
omy. More generally, heightened electoral competition can lead to sustained
revenue gains by encouraging city councils to adopt a more contractual ap-
proach to tax reform that stresses transparency, engagement, and equity.
PROPERTY TAX HAS THE POTENTIAL to be both a primary source of local gov-
ernment revenue in low-income countries and a critical component of efforts
to achieve the broader governance-enhancing objectives of decentralization.1
By providing local governments with expanded revenue, the property tax
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1. Pranab Bardhan, ‘Decentralization of governance and development’, The Journal of
Economic Perspectives 16, 4 (2002), pp. 185–205; Arun Agrawal and Jesse Ribot, ‘Accountability
in decentralization: a framework with South Asian and West African cases’, The Journal of
Developing Areas 33, 4 (1999), pp. 473–502; Jean-Paul Faguet, ‘Does decentralization increase
government responsiveness to local needs? Evidence from Bolivia’, Journal of Public Economics
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promises not only expanded service provision, but also greater decision-
making autonomy for local governments.2 More broadly, a growing chorus
of scholars have noted the potential for the property tax to provide a foun-
dation for expanded local accountability. Barry Weingast has shown that
local governments that rely on their own revenue generation have strong
incentives to support local economic growth.3 Meanwhile, others have
stressed the potential role of property taxation in providing a highly visible
foundation for tax bargaining between citizens and governments, thus sup-
porting accountability and the strengthening of local public services.4
However, despite longstanding international advocacy in favour of prop-
erty tax reform, successful reform has been infrequent.5 The lack of suc-
cessful reform in part reflects challenges of policy, capacity, and resources,6
but there has been growing recognition that the most important barriers to
reform are political, grounded in entrenched resistance by large property
owners.7 While the importance of concerted political leadership has been
increasingly acknowledged, there has been surprisingly little research
2. Roy Bahl and Richard Bird, ‘Subnational taxes in developing countries: The way
forward’, Public Budgeting and Finance 28, 4 (2008), pp. 1–25; Roy Bahl and Jorge
Martinez-Vazquez, ‘The property tax in developing countries: Current practices and pro-
spects’ (Working Paper, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2007); Richard Bird and François
Vaillancourt, ‘Fiscal decentralization in developing countries: An overview’, in Richard Bird
and François Vaillancourt (eds), Fiscal decentralization in developing countries (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1998), pp. 1–48; Ben Lockwood, ‘Political economy approaches
to fiscal decentralization’, in Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio (eds), Does decentralization
enhance service delivery and poverty reduction? (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2009), pp. 79–100;
Anwar Shah, ‘Balance, accountability and responsiveness: Lessons about decentralization’
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank, 2009).
3. Barry Weingast, ‘Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incen-
tives’, Journal of Urban Economics 65 (2009), pp. 279–93.
4. Michael Bell and John Bowman, ‘Adapting the South African property tax to changed cir-
cumstances’ in Michael Bell and John Bowman (eds), Property taxes in South Africa: Challenges
to the post-apartheid era (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA, 2002), pp. 1–22;
William Fischel, ‘Home voters, municipal corporate governance, and the benefit view of prop-
erty tax’, National Tax Journal 54, 1 (2001), pp. 157–74; Wilson Prichard, ‘Taxation and state
building: Towards a governance focused tax reform agenda’ (IDS Working Paper 341,
Institute of Development Studies, 2010); Richard Bird and Enid Slack, ‘Taxing land and
property in emerging economies: Raising revenue and more?’ (International Tax Program
Working Paper, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 2006); Bird
and Vaillancourt, ‘Fiscal decentralization’).
5. Richard Bird, ‘Subnational taxation in developing countries: A review of the literature’,
Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy 2, 1 (2011), pp. 139–61.
6. Roy Kelly, ‘Designing a property tax reform strategy for sub-Saharan Africa: An analytical
framework applied to Kenya’, Public Budgeting and Finance, Winter (2000), pp. 36–51; Roy
Kelly and Zainab Musunu, ‘Implementing property tax reform in Tanzania’, Journal of
Property Tax Assessment and Administration 5, 1 (2000), pp. 5–15.
7. Paul Smoke, ‘Why theory and practice are different: The gap between principles and
reality in subnational revenue systems’ (International Center for Public Policy Working Paper,
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 2013); Bird and Slack,
‘Taxing land and property’; William Dillinger, ‘Urban property tax reform: Guidelines and
recommendations’ (World Bank, World Bank Urban Management Program Tool No.1,
1991); Richard Bird, Taxing agricultural land in developing countries (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1974).
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seeking to understand why political leadership for property tax reform has
emerged in some local government areas and not in others. This is both in-
tellectually and practically important: recognizing the importance of polit-
ical leadership is of limited value without subsequently understanding how
and why such leadership may emerge.
This article seeks to advance our understanding of these questions by
exploring a relatively successful property tax reform programme implemented
in the four largest city councils in Sierra Leone – Makeni, Kenema, Bo, and
Freetown. It draws on extensive interviews with reform leaders, government
officials, civil servants, and taxpayers conducted over three years; detailed gov-
ernment revenue data; first-hand examination of administrative systems in
each city council; a small targeted survey of large property owners in three of
the city councils; and repeated presentation of key findings to government offi-
cials, reform leaders, and donors.8 By exploiting variation in reform outcomes
across the four city councils, the article captures the role of four political
factors that have been critical to shaping reform outcomes: (1) the relation-
ships among economic elites and political leaders; (2) the extent and character
of ethnic diversity; (3) the relationship between local and central political
parties; and (4) the extent and character of local-level political competition.
Given the scarcity of research focusing on the political economy of local
government tax reform, we draw on the broader literatures on decentraliza-
tion and central government tax reform. However, while hypotheses from
these literatures provide a useful starting point, our conclusions go beyond
them by highlighting the unique features of local government tax reform in
four areas. First, we find, similar to the broader literature, that local elite
cohesion has strengthened resistance to tax reform. However, we go further
in arguing that elite resistance to tax reform has been particularly pro-
nounced at the local government level, where elites have often had little
interest in the small-scale services funded by local taxes.9
Second, whereas recent research has highlighted the negative conse-
quences of ethnic diversity for tax compliance and public goods provi-
sion,10 we find evidence that ethnic diversity – reflected in a high share of
8. The core findings of the article were presented on multiple occasions to leaders of the
reform programme, to members of the Local Government Finance Department of the
Ministry of Finance, and to senior officials within the local governments themselves. Note that
we generally do not reference individual interviews throughout the main text, as the conclu-
sions were repeated in multiple meetings with various key stakeholders over the course of
several years. The exception is cases where information can be attributed more explicitly to
particular individuals.
9. Tasha Fairfield, ‘Going where the money is: Strategies for taxing economic elites in
unequal democracies’,World Development 47, 1 (2013), pp. 42–57.
10. James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein,
‘Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?’, American Political Science
Review 101, 4 (2007), pp. 709–25; Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly, ‘Public
goods and ethnic divisions’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 4 (1999), pp. 1243–84.
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migrant large property owners – has also strengthened reform efforts by re-
ducing cohesion among economic and political elites, thus fragmenting re-
sistance and empowering tax enforcement efforts. Third, existing literature
has stressed the negative incentive effects of large intergovernmental trans-
fers,11 but we find that these incentive effects are shaped by political alle-
giances. In opposition-led councils the fear that transfers may be politicized
or delayed generates comparatively strong incentives for autonomous local
tax collection. Finally, while existing literature has made clear that elections
may both encourage and hinder tax reform,12 we present evidence of
the potential for the emergence of virtuous circles of improved taxation
and greater accountability. In at least some cases, competitive elections
may drive not only expanded revenue collection but also a shift toward
more transparent, inclusive, and equitable approaches to reform, which in
turn increase popular support for tax collection and quasi-voluntary tax
compliance.13
The article proceeds as follows. The first section presents a review of the
literature, highlighting potential hypotheses about the political drivers of
divergent tax reform outcomes. The second section provides an introduc-
tion to the decentralization programme, describes the property tax reform,
and details variation in reform outcomes across the four city councils. The
third section presents evidence that these differences in reform outcomes
are best explained by variation in local-level political commitment and lead-
ership. The remainder of the article then demonstrates that effective local
leadership is most likely where local elite resistance is fragmented, the local
government is motivated to seek greater autonomy from the centre, and
local-level political competition creates incentives for more contractual
approaches to local taxation.
The political economy of local government tax reform
The importance of local government tax reform to achieving the governance-
enhancing goals of decentralization has been increasingly noted and rests
on three interconnected elements. First, a government that raises taxes
from its own citizens will be more fiscally independent of central govern-
ment, and better able to align public spending with local priorities. Second,
11. Weingast, ‘Second generation fiscal federalism’.
12. José Antonio Cheibub, ‘Political regimes and the extractive capacity of governments:
Taxation in democracies and dictatorships’,World Politics 50, 3 (1998), pp. 349–76.
13. Margaret Levi, Of rule and revenue (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1988);
Mick Moore, ‘Between coercion and contract: Competing narratives on taxation and govern-
ance’, in Deborah Bräutigam, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, and Mick Moore (eds), Taxation and state
building in developing countries: Capacity and consent (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2008), pp. 34–63.
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the same government will have stronger incentives to be responsive to local
demands in order to encourage tax compliance. And, third, the payment of
local taxes is expected to spur demands for reciprocity and accountability
from local taxpayers, and thus encourage broader processes of tax bargain-
ing.14 However, despite these links, the literature on decentralization has
paid surprisingly limited attention to taxation.15
To the extent that research has addressed the political economy of local
revenue collection, the focus has been on national-level policy actors: what
are the political economy barriers to implementing effective decentraliza-
tion reforms at the national level, and how might such reform be designed
in order to create appropriate incentives for enhanced local government
performance?16 However, this focus sidelines the critical role of local-level
political dynamics in shaping the implementation of decentralization initia-
tives.17 It is these local dynamics that seem to matter most in many African
countries, where significant formal decentralization has been achieved –
often with the involvement of external actors – but there has been little, if
any, progress in strengthening the collection of local taxes.18
In broad terms, existing research makes clear why there has been little
support for local government tax reform. Local governments in low-income
countries tend to be overwhelmingly reliant on central government trans-
fers, while there are significant risks of government capture by powerful
local economic elites resistant to taxation.19 Hampered by weak capacity and
access to limited tax bases, local governments have limited incentives to
pursue more ambitious tax collection, irrespective of supportive national le-
gislation. This situation had given rise to a relatively universal understanding
of the reform challenge: successful reform requires strong ‘political will’
among local leaders in order to overcome local resistance and weak incen-
tives for collection. However, such generic appeals to the importance of
‘political will’ are of limited value unless paired with more detailed empiric-
al research exploring the conditions under which such political leadership
14. Weingast, for example, writes that ‘local revenue generation makes local governments
more responsive to citizens, reduces corruption, and increases the incentives to provide
market-enhancing public goods.… Fiscal independence grants subnational governments bar-
gaining leverage and hence a degree of political independence.’ Weingast, ‘Second generation
fiscal federalism’, p. 290.
15. For example, a recent set of papers on the governance impacts of decentralization in
developing countries pays scant attention to revenue collection, or its importance to govern-
ance outcomes. Jean-Paul Faguet, ‘Decentralization and governance’,World Development 53, 1
(2014), pp. 2–13.
16. Kent Eaton, Kai-Alexander Kaiser, and Paul Smoke, The political economy of decentraliza-
tion reforms: Implications for aid effectiveness (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013); Weingast,
‘Second generation fiscal federalism’.
17. Smoke, ‘Why theory and practice are different’.
18. Roy Bahl, ‘Fiscal decentralization as development policy’, Public Budgeting and Finance
19, 2 (1999), pp. 59–75; Bird, ‘Subnational taxation in developing countries’.
19. Bird, ‘Subnational taxation in developing countries’.
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may emerge – and such research has not been forthcoming to date.20 In
seeking to fill this gap, we draw on insights from the broader literatures on
decentralization and national-level tax reform in formulating initial hypoth-
eses about the factors shaping local-level reform leadership.
The most prominent and intuitive possibility is that local tax outcomes
will be shaped by the extent of elite cohesion and the broader power of elite
economic interests – or, in other words, by the extent to which economic
elites are unified, and have shared interests and personal ties with political
elites.21 Where powerful economic actors are unified and have strong ties to
local political leaders, there is a greater risk of state capture, as economic
elites use their power and connections to prevent the effective implementa-
tion of local tax reform.22 However, a smaller body of literature has argued
that elite cohesion, while posing the risk of state capture, may sometimes be
critical to successful tax reform by facilitating collective decision making
and thus strengthening tax compliance among economic elites.23 Which of
these possibilities predominates is expected to depend on the particular
interests of elite groups: where cohesive elites are motivated to strengthen
the state, increased taxation may follow,24 while economic elites with
narrower interests are likely simply to block effective taxation when they are
cohesive enough to do so.
A second possibility is that local tax reform may be more successful in
ethnically homogeneous local communities. A substantial literature has
highlighted the potential for ethnic heterogeneity to undermine the quality
of public goods provision.25 Parts of this literature, in turn, have focused
specifically on the potential for ethnic diversity to weaken tax collection, as
20. Smoke, ‘Why theory and practice are different’.
21. This definition of elites intentionally does not focus on traditional authorities and senior
bureaucrats. The former are extremely influential in more rural district councils, but have
played a more limited role in shaping taxation in city councils. Meanwhile, while bureaucratic
politics is often cited as an important contributor to tax reform outcomes at the national level,
bureaucratic dynamics prove less important to our story – perhaps owing to the comparative
absence of a highly institutionalized local bureaucracy in Sierra Leone’s newly (re-)created
councils.
22. This possibility is consistent with the centrality of elite cohesion and state capture to
accounts of national-level tax reform, and of decentralization more broadly. Fairfield, ‘Going
where the money is’; Richard Crook, ‘Decentralisation and poverty reduction in Africa: The
politics of local–central relations’, Public Administration and Development 23, 1 (2003), pp. 77–
88; Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee (eds), Decentralization and local governance in devel-
oping countries: A comparative perspective (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006).
23. Kurt Weyland, Democracy without equity: Failures of reform in Brazil (University of
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1996); Dan Slater,Ordering power: Contentious politics and authori-
tarian leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).
24. For example, Dan Slater argues that elites will invest in strengthening taxation, and the
state more broadly, when they face a broad external threat to their existing position. Slater,
Ordering power.
25. Habyarimana et al., ‘Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?’;
Edward Miguel and Mary Kay Gugerty, ‘Ethnic diversity, social sanctions and public goods in
Kenya’, Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005), pp. 2325–68.
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individuals from different ethnic backgrounds may have lower levels of trust
or weak commitment to collective goals.26 Similarly, Kimuli Kasara has
argued that ethnic diversity may weaken the monitoring of tax compliance
and sanctions for non-compliance, as tax collectors and political leaders
may be better able to monitor the economic activities of co-ethnics.27
A third possibility is that variation in local support for reform may be
shaped by divergent experiences of intergovernmental transfers. Weingast
and other proponents of ‘second generation fiscal federalism’ have high-
lighted the extent to which large intergovernmental transfers may under-
mine incentives for local governments to collect their own tax revenue.28 In
turn, within developing countries these incentives may be shaped not only
by formal transfer rules, but also by the informal politicization of trans-
fers,29 as the risk that transfers may be withheld for political reasons may
strengthen incentives for autonomous local government revenue collection.
A fourth possibility relates to the role of elections, which have become a
growing focus of studies of decentralization in developing countries.30 On the
one hand, expanded popular demands for public services through elections
may strengthen incentives for tax collection, while the greater legitimacy
enjoyed by democratic governments may strengthen quasi-voluntary tax com-
pliance.31 On the other hand, democracy may increase the effectiveness of
resistance to taxation, making officials wary of the potential political costs of
taxation.32 The impact of elections is likely to depend not only on the existence
of elections per se, but on their particular characteristics, including their quality,
content, and competitiveness. Most notably, competitive elections are likely to
enhance the incentive effects – both positive and negative – of elections.33
Finally, there is mounting evidence that tax compliance may be signifi-
cantly greater where taxpayers feel that local governments are accountable,
26. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, ‘Public goods and ethnic divisions’.
27. Kimuli Kasara, ‘Tax me if you can: Ethnic geography, democracy, and the taxation of
agriculture in Africa’, American Political Science Review 101, 1 (2007), pp. 159–72.
28. Weingast, ‘Second generation fiscal federalism’.
29. Fernanda Brollo and Tommaso Nannicini, ‘Tying your enemy’s hands in close races:
The politics of federal transfers in Brazil’, American Political Science Review 106, 4 (2012),
pp. 742–61; Afua Banful, ‘Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms elimin-
ate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana’, Journal of Development Economics
96, 2 (2011), pp. 380–90.
30. Weingast, ‘Second generation fiscal federalism’; Barry Weingast, ‘Second generation
fiscal federalism: Political aspects of decentralization and economic development’, World
Development 53, 1 (2014), pp. 14–25; Faguet, ‘Decentralization and governance’.
31. Levi,Of rule and revenue.
32. Cheibub, ‘Political regimes and the extractive capacity of governments’; Carles Boix,
‘Democracy, development and the public sector’, American Journal of Political Science 45, 1
(2001), pp. 1–17; Jeffrey Timmons, ‘Taxation and representation in recent history’, The
Journal of Politics 72, 1 (2010), pp. 191–208.
33. Wilson Prichard, ’Electoral Competitiveness, Political Budget Cycles and Taxation in
Developing Countries’, ICTD Working Paper 24 (Institute of Development Studies,
Brighton, 2014).
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that they receive valued services in return, and that the tax system is fair.34
The existence of such accountability, reciprocity, and fairness should not
be understood as the direct cause of greater political commitment to tax
reform, but, instead, as an important factor in facilitating reform. Efforts to
expand tax collection are likely to be most successful where they include a
contractual element, which may both promote quasi-voluntary tax compli-
ance and build popular support for reform.35
While all of these possibilities are intuitive, none have been systematically
studied at the local government level. Consistent with this general trend, re-
search into taxation within city councils in Sierra Leone has remained strik-
ingly limited. Several studies have looked at local government taxation in
the comparatively rural district councils, reflecting particular interest in the
role of the chieftaincy and in the development impact of mineral wealth.36
However, tax dynamics in city councils are quite distinct from those in dis-
trict councils: chiefs have played a more limited role, mineral revenues are
very limited, and the property tax base is substantially larger and more ac-
cessible. We thus turn to the empirical evidence from the city councils, explor-
ing how key political variables have shaped divergent tax reform outcomes.
Decentralization and property tax reform in Sierra Leone
In 2004, the government of Sierra Leone passed the Local Government Act,
which re-introduced the system of decentralized local governments that had
been abolished in 1972. The new system of local government is based on five
city councils, one smaller municipality, and 13 rural district councils. The
decentralization process was a major priority of both the government and
donors after the conclusion of the civil war in 2002, as extreme centralization
was widely cited as an important cause of the conflict.37 Local council
34. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, and Ingrid Sjursen, ‘Peoples’ views
of taxation in Africa: A review of research on determinants of tax compliance’ (ICTDWorking
Paper 8, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 2012).
35. Moore, ‘Between coercion and contract’.
36. Richard Fanthorpe, ‘Tax administration and representative authority in the chiefdoms
of Sierra Leone’ (London, Department for International Development, 2004); Richard
Fanthorpe, Andrew Lavali, and Mohamed Sesay, ‘Decentralization in Sierra Leone: Impact,
constraints and prospects’ (London, Department for International Development, 2011); Paul
Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians: Rebuilding local government in post-war Sierra Leone’,
Public Administration and Development 35 (2005), pp. 49–58; Paul Jackson, ‘Reshuffling an old
deck of cards? The politics of local government reform in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs 106, 422
(2006), pp. 95–111.
37. Richard Fanthorpe, ‘On the limits of liberal peace: Chiefs and democratic decentraliza-
tion in post-war Sierra Leone’, African Affairs 105, 418 (2006), pp. 27–49; Edward Sawyer,
‘Remove or reform: A case for (restructuring) chiefdom governance in post-conflict Sierra
Leone’, African Affairs 107, 428 (2008), pp. 387–403; Melissa Labonte, ‘From patronage to
peacebuilding? Elite capture and governance from below in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs 111,
442 (2012), pp. 90–115; Daniel Esser, ‘“When we launched the government’s agenda…”: Aid
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elections are held every four years, with directly elected mayors limited to a
single term in office. Those elections are dominated by the two major nation-
al political parties – the All People’s Congress (APC) and Sierra Leone
People’s Party (SLPP). Meanwhile, the local civil service is led by the chief
administrator, who is formally independent but can face significant political
pressures from the mayor and local council.
The newly created local councils immediately faced sharp challenges of
both capacity and legitimacy, and relied heavily on financial transfers from
the central government. These transfers averaged greater than 50 percent of
city council revenue during the period 2006 to 2011, while the central gov-
ernment separately pays most local government salaries and directly pro-
vides major public services. During the years following decentralization,
local revenue collection – which is used primarily to fund additional staff
and small-scale local services – averaged less than 50 percent of budgeted
targets and was concentrated in relatively easy-to-collect market dues, while
collection of harder-to-collect property taxes lagged behind.
Against this background, a property tax reform was initiated in Makeni
City Council in late 2006. The initial reform programme enjoyed signifi-
cant success, leading the Local Government Finance Department of the
Ministry of Finance to play an active role in facilitating the spread of the
reform programme to other city councils. The reform team began meeting
with officials from the Bo, Kenema, and Freetown City Councils in 2007, with
reform implemented in all three locations from 2008. Only one city council –
Koidu-New Sembehun – did not implement the reform programme, but
this appears primarily to reflect the idiosyncrasies of timing, geography, and
donor funding, rather than a purposeful decision by either donors or the
council.
Whereas donors had provided large-scale support to strengthening ex-
penditure functions within the city councils, historically support for revenue
raising has been relatively neglected. As a result the property tax reform was
initiated with very little pre-existing capacity, a limited budget, and com-
paratively modest external support. Given these constraints, the reform pro-
gramme stressed the implementation of a highly simplified property tax
system that relied on the development of new local capacity, operated
within the pre-existing legal framework, and involved five key elements: dis-
covery, assessment, billing, sensitization, and collection.
Discovery and assessment (that is, valuation) involved the assembly and
maintenance of a database of the value of all properties within the city
council borders. The valuation system was based on observable characteris-
tics of individual properties and called for recruiting and training teams of
agencies and local politics in urban Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (2012),
pp. 397–420.
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local assessment staff. Valuation data were then to be recorded using a
simple, locally developed software platform, installed and administered on
a local computer and managed by a newly trained senior assessor.
Discovery and assessment were to be followed by the automated produc-
tion of rate demand notices and the roll-out of sensitization efforts designed
to explain the tax to taxpayers, provide information on the use of tax reven-
ues, and provide opportunities for taxpayers to engage with the council.
The last stage, collection, relied on payments to financial institutions by
taxpayers and, critically, the pursuit of enforcement actions against non-
compliant taxpayers.38 Enforcement amongst large taxpayers was to be of
particular importance, as available data indicate that the largest 100–150
taxpayers in each location account for roughly 50 percent of potential prop-
erty tax collection.39
Though its task was challenging, the reform programme resulted in sub-
stantial improvements in property tax collection across the city councils,
with nominal revenue increasing more than five-fold on average between
2007 and 2011 – more than a three-fold increase in real terms (see
Figure 1).40 While these improvements in collection occurred from a low
base, they exceeded donor expectations,41 were dramatically greater than in
the fifth city council (Koidu-New Sembehun) where the reform pro-
gramme was not adopted, and exceeded performance in similarly sized
local government areas elsewhere in the region.42 As tellingly, property tax
collection grew roughly twice as quickly as other revenue sources, increas-
ing from an average of 15 percent of total revenue collection across the four
city councils in 2006 to 31 percent in 2011.
However, while all of the city councils experienced substantial revenue
gains, there has also been significant variation in outcomes. This is appar-
ent in simple revenue figures. Among the smaller city councils (Bo,
Kenema, and Makeni), revenue increased 450 percent in real terms in Bo
between 2007 and 2011, about 350 percent in Kenema, and only slightly
38. Additional details about the reform programme are available in Samuel Jibao and Wilson
Prichard, ‘Rebuilding local government finances after conflict: The political economy of prop-
erty taxation in post-conflict Sierra Leone’ (ICTD Working Paper 12, Institute of
Development Studies, Brighton, 2013).
39. Data provided by the tax authority in Bo indicate that total tax liabilities for the 107
largest taxpayers were equal to 48 percent of total property tax collection in 2012.
40. Figures in real terms are estimated on the basis of changes in the national consumer
price index (CPI), as council-level inflation data are not available.
41. The World Bank Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) set a
revenue goal of 3,000 Sierra Leonean Leones (Le) by 2009, which was comfortably exceeded
in all four councils.
42. For example, data from Ghana – the most developed country in the region – indicate col-
lection in comparable districts at lower levels than in Sierra Leone. Wilson Prichard and
Vanessa van den Boogaard, ‘Ground-level realities of market taxation in northern Ghana:
Socially embedded practices, unequal power and implications for taxation and governance’
(ICTDWorking Paper 30, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 2015).
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less than 200 percent in Makeni. Collection in Freetown increased two and
half times in real terms during the same period, but is universally viewed as
having been particularly disappointing, given that Freetown has a dramatic-
ally larger tax base on which to draw.43
The same divergence becomes more apparent when considering a wider
range of indicators (summarized in Table 1). All of the city councils experi-
enced dramatic improvements in property identification and valuation (‘dis-
covery’ and ‘assessment’), but there were markedly greater shortcomings in
Freetown. All of the city councils similarly introduced new information
technology (IT) systems to manage property tax data, but again with signifi-
cant variation. Bo City Council introduced the most robust IT system,
which included important elements to ensure transparency and to reduce
the scope for manipulating the data; Kenema adopted a somewhat more
permissive system; while Makeni was most resistant to a more transparent
system. Freetown again lagged behind in failing to fully implement the IT
platform. Turning to outreach efforts, each city council expanded outreach
to taxpayers, but to varying degrees. Most ambitious, again, was the Bo City
Council, which implemented public education programmes, expanded
transparency, new efforts to draw links between revenue and expenditure,
and new forums for engagement with taxpayers. Makeni and Kenema
adopted a more modest course, focused primarily on public education, but
Figure 1. Property tax collection per capita, 2005–11.
Source: Local Government Finance Department, Ministry of Finance, Government of Sierra
Leone.
43. There are, unfortunately, no available estimates of the size of the available tax base
against which to measure collection efficiency formally. That said, revenue per capita in
Freetown only narrowly exceeded that in Bo City Council by 2012, despite Freetown being
home to a vastly greater share of the country’s wealth.
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with minimal investment in expanding transparency and dialogue, while
Freetown made the least significant progress on all fronts.
Most striking have been differences across councils in efforts to pursue
enforcement actions against large taxpayers. Because no official figures on
tax compliance are available, we conducted a small survey of large taxpayers
in Bo, Makeni, and Kenema in May and June 2012, supported by comple-
mentary interviews with taxpayers and key stakeholders. Owing to the
Table 1. Implementation of different components of the reform programme
Bo City Council Makeni City
Council
Kenema City
Council
Freetown City
Council
Discovery
and
assessment
Near universal
property
identification
and
assessment
Near universal
property
identification
and
assessment
Near universal
property
identification
and
assessment
Significant
problems.
Local officials
estimate 25
percent of
properties
identified and
valued
Billing Successfully
implemented,
including
transparent
and
tamper-proof
IT System
Basic system
implemented,
but with less
robust IT
System
Basic system
implemented,
but with less
robust IT
System
Partially
implemented,
with only a
very
rudimentary
IT system
Sensitization Significant
public
education and
outreach to
create
increased
transparency
and new
forums for
engagement
Significant
public
education
about the tax,
but minimal
additional
outreach and
transparency
after 2007
Significant
public
education
about the tax,
but minimal
additional
outreach and
transparency
Little public
outreach, and
consistent
resistance to
greater
transparency
about revenue
collection and
spending
Enforcement Effective
enforcement,
even among
elites
Initial
enforcement
efforts
curtailed after
2007, with
limited
enforcement
action taken
against elites
Some
enforcement
among
average
taxpayers, but
very limited
enforcement
among elite
groups
Weak
enforcement
among elites
Source: Information collected by the authors.
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much larger size of Freetown, a fully reliable and comparable survey was
impractical except at major cost – and was effectively unnecessary, as there
is universal agreement among key stakeholders that enforcement efforts
there have lagged far behind the other councils.44
The survey targeted 40 large taxpayers in each location, out of a total
population of 100–150 such large taxpayers in each city. In Bo City
Council we were given access to the full property register and sampled 40
taxpayers with property tax liabilities exceeding 450,000 Sierra Leonean
Leones (Le) (slightly more than US$100), with the largest taxpayer owing
Le8.5 million (US$2,000). We were not given the same access to property
registers in Kenema and Makeni, and thus drew a random sample of tax-
payers of comparable size and type to those in Bo from wealthy residential
and commercial areas.45
The results reported in Table 2 – fully supported by qualitative
interviews – match the trends described so far, with compliance much
higher in Bo than in either Makeni or Kenema.46 This higher compliance
has been matched by much more effective enforcement, as residents in Bo
were more likely to have been taken to court for non-payment, to know
Table 2. Taxpayer compliance and enforcement across councils
Able to produce a
property tax
receipt
Resident-owner
has been taken to
court
Knows property
owner who has
been taken to
court
Believes elites can
be successfully
taken to court
Bo City
Council
93.0% 17.9% 37.5% 87.5%
Kenema
City
Council
38.5% 0% 9.4% 31.0%
Makeni
City
Council
41.7% 8.30% 7.5% 25.0%
Source: Results of a survey of large business owners conducted in May–June 2012.
44. Those interviewed estimated that effective valuation and compliance has reached only
perhaps 25 percent of relevant properties, with effective enforcement concentrated on a
handful of large, often foreign-owned, commercial taxpayers.
45. While this may raise concerns about uneven sampling, the survey teams made significant
efforts to verify the completeness of the property register for large taxpayers in Bo, while the
relatively small numbers of large taxpayers in each location, coupled with the familiarity of the
survey teams with each council area, gives us a high degree of confidence in the reliability and
comparability of the samples.
46. Given the unreliability of self-reported compliance, the survey teams asked respondents
to produce tax receipts to verify actual compliance.
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someone who had been taken to court, and to believe that elites could be
forced to comply with tax obligations effectively.
The political foundations of divergent outcomes
Although essentially the same reform programme was initiated in all four
city councils, results differed markedly. This variation cannot be explained
easily in technocratic terms. The city councils in Bo, Kenema, and Makeni
are of broadly similar size, are similarly reliant on external transfers, and
have similar economies and tax bases (see Table 3). In all three cases, local
administrative capacity for the property tax was very limited at the outset
and developed over the course of the reform programme. Freetown offers a
more complex comparison, but there is no obvious technical reason to
expect weaker performance.47 While property identification and valuation
in Freetown are more complex owing to its larger size, the capital also has
access to greater technical capacity, a more developed economy, a larger tax
base, and relatively fewer transfers, all of which would lead us to expect
better, not worse, local revenue performance. Instead, the explanation for
divergent reform performance lies primarily in divergent political commit-
ment to reform across city councils.
Table 3. Comparative characteristics of Bo, Makeni, and Kenema
city councils
Bo City
Council
Makeni City
Council
Kenema City
Council
Population 149,957 82,840 128,402
Poverty score+ 53.88 52.20 55.23
Transfers as a share of total
revenue (avg. 2005–11)++
61% 72% 58%
Political affiliation SLPP APC SLPP
+: No GDP figures are available at the city council level. The “poverty score” was calculated
by the Government of Sierra Leone based on the 2004 Census, with higher values implying
less poverty, and captures the similarity of economic conditions.
++: Excludes central government payments for staffing and direct local expenditure by central
government line ministries.
Sources: Population data from 2004 Census; Poverty score from Government of Sierra Leone
2004 Population and Housing Survey Analytical Report on Poverty; Transfers data from the
Local Government Finance Department.
47. Freetown has also been home to complex political interactions between local, national,
and international actors, which have contributed to poor reform performance across a range of
areas. While these broader issues are not addressed here owing to constraints of space, they are
consistent with the overall argument: particularly poor performance in Freetown reflects polit-
ical, rather than technical, barriers. Esser, ‘“When we launched the government’s agenda”’.
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The importance of political leadership is revealed most clearly in import-
ant shifts in support for reform following national and local elections in
2007 and 2008, respectively. The Makeni City Council was the first council
to implement the reform programme, with an active reform leadership
making major strides in late 2006 and throughout 2007. This included
the successful implementation of property discovery and a new IT system,
extensive outreach efforts, and rapid increases in revenue collection.
However, the 2008 local elections brought a much less supportive govern-
ment to power, resulting in reduced outreach, an unwillingness to upgrade
the IT system, and strong resistance to enforcing compliance among elites.
While revenue continued to increase gradually from 2008 to 2010 based on
the foundation put in place in 2007, revenue had begun to decline by 2011,
while the policy reversal was unambiguous, eventually forcing the reform
team to withdraw from the council.
The same decisive role of changes in government is apparent in Bo,
where the 2008 elections saw the election of Mayor Wusu Sannoh, a former
university lecturer. Whereas the previous government had been hesitant to
advance the reform programme, the new mayor immediately embraced it
and pushed through ambitious new measures. Unlike what happened in the
other councils, in Bo concerted political leadership allowed for the imple-
mentation of a more transparent IT system, the creation of significant new
public transparency and consultation around tax collection, and active and
successful efforts to enforce compliance among local elites. Interviews with
those involved make clear that at every stage these ambitious reforms – and
expanded enforcement in particular – required the resolve of the mayor,
supported by the chief administrator, in confronting concerted resistance
from powerful property owners.
Kenema presents a middle ground between Makeni and Bo, as support
for reform was relatively constant over time, but with important limitations.
The government actively supported discovery, valuation, and the expansion
of collection, but was never willing to implement a fully transparent IT
system and largely refused to pursue effective enforcement action targeting
elites.
Finally, reform efforts consistently faltered in Freetown, where efforts to
promote reform date at least to 2005. Despite regular meetings with reform
leaders from Bo andMakeni, a lack of political leadership meant that mean-
ingful reform only got under way in 2009. It has been comparatively unsuc-
cessful at every stage, with only an estimated 25 percent of properties
valued by 2011, concerns that valuations were regressive, extremely limited
transparency, and weak enforcement. While Freetown experienced early
revenue gains, the largest gains actually predate the full implementation of
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the reform programme, reflecting the much larger tax base and the com-
parative ineffectiveness of the reform programme itself.48
Explaining variation in political commitment to reform
There is little question that the existence, or absence, of political commit-
ment within the city councils has figured centrally in explaining divergent
outcomes. According to the leader of the initial reform programme, Paul
Fish, ‘successful reform requires the leadership of either the chief adminis-
trator or the mayor, and ideally both’,49 while changes in the mayoral lead-
ership have been particularly decisive.50 However, this observation alone is
widely accepted, as studies of public sector reform now routinely highlight
the importance of ‘political will’ to reform outcomes.51 The more import-
ant research challenge lies in identifying the sources of variation in political
commitment to reform.
This effort is fraught with potential risks for two reasons in particular.
First, political leadership and commitment to reform are inevitably idiosyn-
cratic to some degree, as there is no way to account fully for the good
fortune of having a talented and committed mayoral candidate. Second, the
factors that may help to explain variation in political leadership, such as
elections or ethnic diversity, may affect political incentives through multiple
alternative causal pathways in different contexts. For example, we know that
elections may in some contexts inspire increased tax collection, in order to
fund popular services, while in other contexts elections may discourage tax
collection, owing to the risk of alienating political supporters.52 There is
correspondingly limited value in seeking to arrive at a single, immutable,
relationship between elections and tax collection. Instead, greater analytical
value comes from better understanding the nuance of particular causal pro-
cesses and from exploring the contexts in which particular outcomes are
most likely to occur. With these goals in mind, we consider the roles of elite
48. While specific data are not available, it is widely felt by those close to the city council that
the increase in revenue was driven by the taxation of a relatively small group of commercial
properties, and most notably banks, while taxation of residential properties – owned by politic-
ally connected elites – has lagged far behind.
49. Interview (Prichard), Paul Fish, leader of reform programme, Toronto, Canada,
September 10, 2011.
50. In our cases the chief administrators, while important players, have broadly followed the
lead of the mayor and council in advancing, or blocking, reform. Meanwhile, the weakness of
pre-existing administrative capacity for the property tax has meant that entrenched bureaucrat-
ic interests have not played a decisive role.
51. Richard Bird, ‘Tax administration and tax reform: Reflections on experience’, in Javad
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Anwar Shah (eds), Tax policy in developing countries (World Bank,
Washington DC, 1991), pp. 38–56; Brian Levy and Sahr Kpundeh (eds), Building state capacity
in Africa: New approaches, emerging lessons (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004).
52. Cheibub, ‘Political regimes and the extractive capacity of governments’.
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cohesion, ethnic diversity, intergovernmental transfers, and elections as im-
portant determinants of political leadership for reform.
Elite cohesion and tax enforcement
The most widely cited barrier to effective local property tax collection in
Sierra Leone has been high levels of elite cohesion, with close ties and over-
lapping interests among economic elites and political leaders leading to
weak tax enforcement. This appears to have reflected both the strength of
direct personal ties and shared interests between economic and political
elites, and the power wielded by local economic elites by virtue of their role
in shaping local economic opportunity and financing local elections.53 In
turn, weak enforcement has had direct revenue implications, owing to
limited taxation of the largest and most valuable properties, but has equally
undermined both support for essential administrative reform and the
broader popular legitimacy of reform efforts.
This pattern is most apparent in Kenema, where informants almost
universally point to the weakness of enforcement among elites as the primary
reform challenge. Weak enforcement, we argue, is rooted in close ties
between political and economic elites that date to the civil war period,
during which local elites were often excused from virtually all public levies.
Freetown offers a more extreme case, as the city council finds itself unable
to enforce property taxes effectively among the national elite, who combine
economic clout and national-level political influence. In this case it is not
merely cohesion, but the relative subservience of the city council to national
elites that undermines tax collection. By contrast, the government in Bo
was felt to be much more independent of the local economic elite, reflected
most notably in the mayor being a university lecturer. In turn, the Bo gov-
ernment attributes its success in pursuing enforcement in large part to their
relative independence and the comparative lack of cohesion among the
local economic elite.
While the role of elite cohesion in blocking reform efforts is highly intui-
tive, it stands in contrast to some earlier literature stressing the importance
of elite cohesion in facilitating national-level tax reform. While somewhat
counterintuitive, this literature has proposed a two-step argument. First,
governments will be unable to substantially strengthen tax collection
without elite buy-in and political support. Second, such support is more
likely where there is greater elite cohesion: when elites are fragmented they
will pursue narrow strategies to reduce their tax burdens, while a unified
elite may opt to engage government proactively to strengthen tax collection
53. Labonte, ‘From patronage to peacebuilding?’.
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and make investments in strengthening the state.54 This literature does not
view elite cohesion as a guarantee of improved performance and, indeed,
stresses that elites most often use their influence simply to avoid taxes.
However, authors in this tradition argue that elite cohesion has been a crit-
ical facilitating condition in the most successful examples of tax reform.
However, while elite cohesion has undoubtedly contributed to tax reform
in some national contexts, experiences in Sierra Leone provide tentative evi-
dence that the potential benefits of elite cohesion are particularly unlikely to
arise at the local government level. At the national level, there are a variety of
reasons why cohesive elite groups may favour more effective taxation, for
example in order to strengthen security and supportive state institutions or
finance market-supporting services.55 By contrast, local government revenue
is used primarily to finance basic local government services, including sanita-
tion, market services, and minor road repairs, while local governments
receive the vast majority of revenue and investment through central gov-
ernment transfers. Intuitively, local economic elites appear comparatively
unlikely to view local government services as essential to their core interests,
making them correspondingly more likely to use their political influence to
escape effective taxation. And, indeed, this is the pattern reported by local
leaders in Bo, who have explicitly sought to build support for tax reform not
by catering directly to the preferences of local elites, but, instead, by build-
ing a broader base of popular support for taxation through public outreach
and the extension of small-scale but broadly popular services.
Ethnic diversity, elite cohesion, and tax enforcement
The second message to emerge prominently from the case study evidence is
that ethnic diversity – as measured specifically by the share of migrants
among large property owners – has played an important role in facilitating tax
reform. It has reduced elite cohesion, thus making it is easier for local govern-
ments to pursue enforcement efforts.56 This message was repeated frequently
54. Slater, Ordering power; Weyland, Democracy without equity; Evan Lieberman, Race and
regionalism in the politics of taxation in Brazil and South Africa (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2003).
55. Dan Slater identifies several cases from South-East Asia in which elites rallied behind
expanded taxation by the state in order to support investments in both security and public ser-
vices designed to quell resistance by popular opposition and rebel movements. Evan
Lieberman highlights the role of apartheid in leading elites to support very high levels of tax-
ation in South Africa in order to build a powerful state apparatus for repression and redistribu-
tion to low-income whites. Slater,Ordering power; Lieberman, Race and regionalism.
56. Elsewhere, Prichard has proposed a similar story for understanding the relative effective-
ness of tax collection in Kenya post-independence, as the African-led government was com-
paratively willing to enforce taxation among largely European and Asian-origin economic
elites. Wilson Prichard, Taxation, responsiveness and accountability in sub-Saharan Africa: The
dynamics of tax bargaining (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, forthcoming).
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by reform officials, who believed that it was easier to overcome tax resistance
by a more mixed, and less cohesive, community of large property owners.
Our survey of large property owners allowed us to investigate these claims
more systematically. As a first step we sought to explore the share of migrants
among large property owners in each of Bo, Makeni, and Kenama. This is
not an effort to measure ethnic diversity in general, but instead aims to
capture a particular aspect of diversity: the distinction between indigenous
property owners and migrant property owners, which is expected to shape
the extent of elite cohesion in response to property taxes. Consistent with
the claims of reform leaders, we find that a greater share of large property
owners – and particularly of politically influential resident property owners –
are migrants in Bo, whereas the share of migrant property owners is lower in
Makeni and Kenema (see Table 4). In turn, the survey responses offer clear
support for the contention that enforcement actions have been more exten-
sive in Bo. Almost 40 percent of respondents in Bo reported knowing a prop-
erty owner who had been taken to court for non-compliance, while the same
was true of less than 10 percent of respondents in Makeni and Kenema.
There is thus, at a minimum, a clear correlation between a larger share of
migrants and the strength of enforcement efforts, both of which are substan-
tially higher in Bo.
Moving beyond simple correlation, if a higher share of migrants facilitates
greater tax enforcement, then we might expect to find that migrants are dis-
proportionately targeted by enforcement actions. To explore this possibility,
we asked those who reported knowing a property owner who had been taken
to court for non-compliance whether that property owner was a migrant. In
all three locations, the share of migrants among those who reportedly were
taken to court was meaningfully larger than the overall share of migrants
within the population of larger property owners. More simply, survey
responses indicate that migrant owners of large property have been more
likely to face enforcement actions by governments (see Table 4). Indeed, in
Kenema not a single respondent was aware of a non-migrant who had been
taken to court for a failure to pay taxes. Of course, these responses need to be
treated with care, as the beliefs and statements of property owners may be a
poor reflection of the actual share of migrant property owners among those
taken to court.57 However, they ultimately offer important support for the
57. For example, enforcement action against migrants might be more memorable or more
public. Alternatively, local property owners may prefer to offer the impression that migrants are
the major tax evaders, while migrant property owners may wish to signal that the tax authorities
disproportionately target them. However, we have no evidence of these types of systematic
bias. Indeed, the opposite bias could equally exist: prosecution of non-migrant property
owners might be more memorable and public, while local property owners might prefer to
signal that they, in fact, are targeted by the government.
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possibility that a higher share of migrants among property owners can facili-
tate greater enforcement.
There is a potential dark side to this finding, as it suggests that migrants
are forced to bear a disproportionate share of the tax burden owing to their
lack of political influence and local connections. While this is not entirely
surprising, it is certainly contrary to basic notions of equity and fairness. To
the extent that increased revenue collection is the result of more aggressive
targeting of migrants it would be problematic to label such an outcome a
“success”. And, indeed, in Kenema and Makeni in particular available evi-
dence suggests that migrant property owners have been forced to bear a dis-
proportionate share of expanded collection.
However, experience in Bo suggests that there is also a more optimistic
side to the story. The survey evidence and interviews suggest that while there
has been some targeting of migrant property owners, the larger share of
migrants has also facilitated a more generalized and much larger increase in
enforcement among both migrants and non-migrants.While the survey sug-
gests that migrants are slightly more likely than non-migrants to be targeted
by enforcement actions, both migrants and non-migrants are far more likely
Table 4. Origin of large property owners in Bo, Kenema, andMakeni
Share of
migrant
property
owners
Share of
migrants
among
resident
property
owners
Share who
have resided in
current
location < 20
years
Share who
have resided in
current
location < 10
years
Knows
property
owner
who has
been
taken to
court
Share of
migrant
property
owners among
reported
prosecutions
for tax
evasion
Bo 52.5% 53.6% 44% 24.0% 37.50% 60%
Kenema 38.0% 31.0% 37.4% 18.7% 9.4% 100%
Makeni 27.5% 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% 7.5% 66.7%
Notes: ‘Migrant’ is defined as someone not born in the region of the country (north, south,
east, west) in which the city lies.58 Questions about the duration of residence in the city offer an
alternative measure to ensure consistency of the results.
Source: Results of field survey of large business owners conducted in May–June 2012.
58. We rely on these four regions because they best capture the major political, ethnic, and
religious cleavages in the country, and are a dominant frame of reference locally. The northern
region is more heavily Muslim, and largely aligned with the APC party, while the largest ethnic
group is the Temne. By contrast, the southern region is largely aligned with the SLPP and has
a larger Christian population, while the Mende are the largest ethnic group. The eastern region
more closely resembles the southern region, but is more remote, more religiously diverse and
was most heavily affected by the war. Finally, the western region includes Freetown, which is
by far the largest urban area in the country, and its surrounding areas.
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to be targeted by enforcement actions than in the other city councils. Our
conclusion is that the larger share of migrants in Bo has contributed to redu-
cing the strength of the political opposition mobilized collectively by large
property owners, shifting expectations and emboldening enforcement efforts
among all taxpayers. This interpretation flows from the survey responses, but
more directly from interviews with those involved with the reform pro-
gramme itself. Local government officials in Bo are explicit in arguing that
they do not target migrant property owners specifically, while those involved
with the reform programme note that the larger presence of migrant property
owners has weakened overall resistance to reform.
On the surface these findings appear to be in conflict with recent research
findings about the negative implications of ethnic diversity for taxation and
public goods provisions. However, the difference reflects a focus on alterna-
tive causal pathways.59 Arguments linking ethnic diversity to less effective
tax collection focus on the impact of diversity on attitudes toward tax com-
pliance60 and on the ability of governments to monitor compliance with
taxes that are difficult to monitor.61 By contrast, the evidence here focuses
on the impact of a particular aspect of ethnic diversity – the share of recent
migrants among large property owners – on elite cohesion and, by exten-
sion, on the political feasibility of effective tax enforcement.62
While most research has focused on the potentially negative impact of
ethnic diversity on attitudes toward tax compliance, the evidence here sug-
gests that the impact of diversity on tax enforcement may be more important
to actual tax collection, at least when it comes to property taxation. Why
might this be the case? While quasi-voluntary compliance, driven by trust
in government and other citizens, is undoubtedly important, the term itself
presupposes at least credible enforcement. Few taxpayers will pay taxes
purely out of a commitment to the public good, and entirely irrespective of
59. An alternative possibility is that the findings from Sierra Leone might reflect the relatively
mild salience of ethnicity as a barrier to collective action, as argued by Glennerster, Miguel,
and Rothenberg, but this would not account for the positive effect of diversity on enforcement,
and does not match the qualitative evidence gathered from reform leaders and government offi-
cials. Rachel Glennerster, Edward Miguel, and Alexander Rothenberg, ‘Collective action in
diverse Sierra Leone communities’, The Economic Journal 123, 568 (2013), pp. 285–316.
60. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, ‘Public goods and ethnic divisions’.
61. Kasara, ‘Tax me if you can’.
62. This conclusion shares a degree of conceptual commonality with recent arguments
about the potentially positive impact of ethnic diversity on the emergence of unified and polit-
ically active business communities. Handley has argued that where there is close ethnic overlap
between state elites and the business community, the latter tends to become dependent on the
state, while seeking narrow benefits and opportunities for rent seeking. By contrast, where
such overlap does not exist, the business community is more likely to develop autonomous
capacity as a political actor, leading to broader improvements in the quality of governance. The
argument here represents the other side of the same coin: where there is less overlap between
the state and business elites, the state is more likely to be autonomous, and to enforce tax
demands on large businesses. Antoinette Handley, Business and the state in Africa: Economic
policy-making in the neo-liberal era (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008).
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the presence of effective enforcement, which both encourages compliance
and ensures that everyone pays their fair share.63 Instead, the concept of
‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ proposes that factors that strengthen taxpayer
confidence in the state, and support for public initiatives, will increase tax
compliance when pursued in combination with measures to strengthen en-
forcement and equal application of the law.64 Where enforcement is rela-
tively effective, measures to enhance quasi-voluntary compliance may be
comparatively decisive in improving outcomes. By contrast, where enforce-
ment is extremely weak, improved enforcement may be a necessary first
step towards expanded collection, which can then be complemented by
‘softer’measures to encourage compliance (as discussed below). This logic
is particularly relevant to property taxation, where traditionally enforce-
ment has been remarkably ineffective, but where improved enforcement is
also extremely feasible owing to the ease of identifying both the tax base
(the property itself ) and the taxpayer (by virtue of the immobility of the
property). The centrality of enforcement as a starting point for property tax
reform suggests that the impact of diversity on enforcement may thus be of
greater importance in shaping outcomes than the impact of diversity on atti-
tudes toward compliance.
Finally, a note is required about the unique case of Freetown. On the
surface it appears to offer a counter-example. It is the most cosmopolitan
city in Sierra Leone, but has nonetheless experienced the weakest tax per-
formance of the four city councils. However, this superficial contradiction
merely clarifies the two-step nature of the argument. Ethnic diversity does
not itself lead to greater tax collection, but may do so indirectly by contrib-
uting to reduced cohesion among elites resistant to effective taxation, and
the consequent weakening of resistance. In the particular case of Freetown,
however, this causal chain breaks down. Most basically, elite resistance to
property taxation is stronger in Freetown because of the character of those
resisting, as it is home to the most powerful national economic and political
elites. Moreover, while local political elites everywhere in the country are
dependent to some extent on national elites for their political success and
survival, this dependence appears particularly entrenched in Freetown,
which is both closer geographically to national elites and draws greater na-
tional attention because of its political and economic importance.
63. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, ‘What’s trust got to do with it? Non-payment of service charges in
local authorities in South Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 42, 4 (2004), pp. 539–62.
64. Margaret Levi, who introduced the term ‘quasi-voluntary’ compliance, argues explicitly
that methods to encourage quasi-voluntary compliance are not a substitute for enforcement.
Instead, they are complementary: ‘quasi-voluntary compliance bolstersmechanisms of monitor-
ing and enforcement’ [emphasis added]. Levi, ‘Of rule and revenue’.
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Political alignment, intergovernmental transfers, and incentives
for revenue collection
The third message that emerges from the case studies is that city councils
controlled by the political opposition have had stronger incentives to raise
local tax revenue. This reflects their stronger incentives to seek fiscal auton-
omy from the central government, largely out of a fear that transfers may
be withheld or delayed for political reasons, particularly in the run-up to
elections.65
Following the 2007 elections that brought the APC to power nationally,
tax reform has been most successful in opposition-held Bo and Kenema,
while there has been little reform in APC-dominated Makeni and Freetown.
Most striking is the case of Makeni, where the local APC government
showed significant support for reform while the SLPP was in power nationally,
but where support for reform began to decline quite immediately following
the election of the APC at the national level. Government leaders in oppos-
ition-led councils, particularly in Bo, prominently and repeatedly cited the
risk that government transfers may be politicized as a primary motivation
for strengthening local revenue collection.
This fear is consistent with research demonstrating the politicization of
fiscal transfers elsewhere in the developing world.66 However, establishing
a clear and unambiguous empirical pattern of politicization in Sierra Leone
is not possible. Tables 5a and 5b report annual per capita transfers to all
APC- and SLPP-controlled councils, respectively, from 2006 to the first
half of 2012.67 Figures are reported including (Table 5b) and excluding
(Table 5a) Freetown, given its large size and consequent influence on per
capita figures. On one hand, the data reveal a sharp decline in the share of
transfers to SLPP councils in 2008 and 2009, following the election of the
APC nationally. There is also a very modest decline in transfers to
SLPP-controlled councils in the run-up to the 2012 elections. On the other
hand, when Freetown is included, total transfers per capita remain very
close to equal between SLPP- and APC-controlled councils throughout the
period since 2008 – while when Freetown is excluded we see a sharp rise in
transfers to opposition-controlled councils after 2009.
65. This possibility has also been raised in a study of urban governance in Lusaka. Danielle
Resnick, ‘In the shadow of the city: Africa’s urban poor in opposition strongholds’, Journal of
Modern African Studies 49, 1 (2011), pp. 141–66.
66. Brollo and Nannicini, ‘Tying your enemy’s hands in close races’; Banful, ‘Do formula-
based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting?’.
67. We focus on all councils, instead of city councils alone, in order to expand the sample
size, and attempt to smooth out the effects of idiosyncratic variation. However, data for city
councils alone are equally inconclusive. We further experiment with calculating average trans-
fers to APC and SLPP councils weighting councils equally, rather than on a per capita basis,
and results are broadly similar.
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Table 5a. Central government transfers by political affiliation, excluding Freetown
Annual total transfers
(Le)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (Q1+Q2)
APC average per capita
transfer (by population)
4606.6 1435.2 5028.5 5734.5 8456.8 8172.4 3061.4
SLPP average per capita
transfer (by population)
5319.6 1682.7 4579.5 5353.5 10267.3 9628.5 3491.8
Ratio SLPP–APC 1.15 1.17 0.91 0.93 1.21 1.18 1.14
Table 5b. Central government transfers by political affiliation, including Freetown
Annual total transfers
(Le)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (Q1+Q2)
APC average per capita
transfer (by population)
4533.6 1395.3 4803.5 5274.9 9795.9 9689.1 3747.9
SLPP average per capita
transfer (by population)
5319.6 1682.7 4579.5 5353.5 10267.3 9628.5 3491.8
Ratio SLPP–APC 1.17 1.21 0.95 1.01 1.05 0.99 0.93
Notes: Excludes Bonthe Municipal Council, which has experienced extreme year-to-year variation in transfers out of proportion to all other councils.
Source: Local Government Finance Department, Ministry of Finance, Government of Sierra Leone.
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These suggestive, but not entirely conclusive, trends do not necessarily
imply the absence of politicization. The detailed government data on which
we rely may be imprecise or inaccurate, while governments may politicize
transfers in more subtle ways, as with delayed disbursements. The striking
(and difficult to explain) volatility of transfers, coupled with the relative
decline in transfers to SLPP councils in 2008 and 2009, could be consistent
with politicization, and would almost certainly have fostered the perception
of politicization.68 The leaders of opposition councils have a clear belief
that there has been politicization, and a clear fear of the possibility of further
politicization at critical moments, and these beliefs and expectations have
been critical to fostering greater commitment to tax reform in opposition-
led councils.
Political competition, ‘contractual’ taxation, and revenue collection
The final lesson from the case studies relates to the complex relationship
between local elections and tax collection. While all local governments in
Sierra Leone hold elections, these elections have varied dramatically in the
extent of electoral competitiveness. While expanded competitiveness may
enhance or discourage tax reform depending on the context, experience in
Sierra Leone highlights the potential for more competitive elections to spur
greater attention to tax reform and, perhaps more critically, to incentivize
the implementation of more contractual approaches to tax reform.
In general, local-level elections in Sierra Leone have remained relatively
uncompetitive, with the APC dominating elections in the north and the
SLPP dominating elections in the south. In this context, electoral victors
have generally received upward of 65 percent of the vote, and often much
higher, and thus face little meaningful electoral threat and relatively little
pressure to respond to popular demands. However, the 2007 elections in
Bo City Council presented an exception to this trend, as leading members
of the dominant SLPP party organized a rival party, the People’s Movement
for Democratic Change (PMDC), which briefly posed a significant electoral
threat. Although many PMDC leaders eventually returned to the SLPP, Bo
City Council remained by far the most competitive of the city council elec-
tions, with the SLPP receiving only 46 percent of the vote.
This enhanced electoral competitiveness is credited at least in part with
enabling future Mayor Wusu Sannoh to achieve the SLPP nomination and
with creating incentives for him to lead an ambitious local tax reform
programme after the election. Leading council officials are explicit and
68. Melissa Labonte similarly notes this measure of unpredictability in central government
transfers, owing to the regular revision of grant formulas. Labonte, ‘From patronage to peace-
building?’
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adamant in arguing that their efforts to raise tax revenue were motivated to
a significant extent by a need to fulfil electoral promises by expanding
public services. As importantly, they viewed this effort as an important part
of their strategy for achieving re-election for the SLPP in 2012. While the
majority of local revenue arrives through central transfers, local government
revenues provide critical revenue for small-scale local services, including
sanitation, market infrastructure and cleaning, public bus services, and
public toilets. As noted earlier, this division of labour may explain why
economic elites have little interest in local taxes, as they have little need for
the services that they provide. By contrast, the services provided through
local government taxes are popular and valuable among lower-income con-
stituencies, who appear to have become more electorally relevant amidst
increased electoral competition.69
While electoral incentives figured centrally in the decision to prioritize
the tax reform programme, competitive elections also generated incen-
tives for the Bo City Council to adopt a more contractual approach to
property tax reform that stressed the existence of a ‘fiscal contract’
between government and taxpayers in order to build a sustainable and
broad base of political support.70 This effort involved three broad compo-
nents. First, the government stressed transparency about what revenue is
collected, while making explicit efforts to draw clear connections between
revenue collection and the provision of new or improved services. Second,
the government built on this basic transparency through efforts to engage
in active outreach to taxpayers, including a weekly call-in radio show with
senior officials. Third, the government drew public attention to its efforts
to ensure enforcement among large property owners, repositioning en-
forcement among elites as a political asset in seeking broad-based public
support, rather than as a political liability. These efforts not only gener-
ated short-term political support, but also appear to have provided the
basis for sustaining reform more effectively over time in the face of pres-
sures for reversal.
None of this is to suggest that greater electoral competition will always be
translated into more successful tax reform. Elections generate multiple
competing incentives and are likely to have mixed impacts. However, the
evidence here highlights the potential for more competitive and meaningful
local elections to set in motion a virtuous circle of expanded reform and ac-
countability. Electoral pressures not only helped to generate support for
69. Recent research at the district council level finds that satisfaction with these small-scale
local services is an important determinant of support for local government taxation. Samuel
Jibao and Wilson Prichard, ‘Tax perceptions in the periphery: The local foundations of tax
compliance in district councils in Sierra Leone’ (ICTD Working Paper, Institute of
Development Studies, Brighton, 2015).
70. Moore, ‘Between coercion and contract’, p. 37.
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raising local revenue, but also shaped the character of the reform process
itself, creating incentives to build popular support for reform through trans-
parency, engagement, and a focus on equity, thus laying the foundation for
sustained progress. This type of positive dynamic appears particularly likely
in relation to property taxation, which is both highly visible and progressive,
and thus well suited to building broad-based popular support for improved
enforcement. However, there are reasons to believe that there may also be a
more general potential for the creation of such virtuous circles at the local
government level, as local governments are well positioned to draw explicit
connections between local revenue raising and small-scale services valued
by the majority. This is a topic that demands further research.
Conclusions
Given the growing recognition that the most important barriers to property
tax reform in low-income countries are political, this article is among the
first to capture systematically the local political drivers of successful reform.
The research has stressed four sets of factors that have been critical to
shaping sub-national variation in reform outcomes. First, elite cohesion
served as a critical barrier to tax reform, and particularly to effective en-
forcement, by strengthening the effectiveness of resistance by economic
elites. Second, ethnic diversity – as reflected in a higher share of migrant
large property owners – enhanced the effectiveness of reform by fragment-
ing elite resistance. Third, opposition councils showed a stronger commit-
ment to local tax collection in response to the risk, whether real or
perceived, of the politicization of intergovernmental transfers. Finally, ex-
perience in the Bo City Council illustrated the potential for competitive
local elections not only to expand incentives for tax collection, but also to
shape the character of tax reform efforts in the direction of greater transpar-
ency, inclusiveness, and equity.
These factors are not to be understood as simple and immutable deter-
minants of successful reform. Elections, political alignment, and ethnic di-
versity can shape outcomes through multiple causal pathways, and will
almost certainly have diverse implications for reform in different contexts.
There is an obvious need for caution in generalizing from the limited set of
cases explored here, and beyond the specific dynamics of property taxation.
However, the findings offer a valuable starting point for a clearer under-
standing of the politics of property tax reform in low-income countries, in
part by highlighting often overlooked and distinctive features of tax dynam-
ics at the local government level. In particular, elite cohesion appears par-
ticularly likely to undermine tax reform at the local government level,
owing to the ease of local state capture but also a lack of interest among
local elites in the services funded by local revenues. By contrast,
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competitive local elections may be particularly beneficial to local govern-
ment tax reform efforts, as local governments are comparatively able to
draw connections between local taxes and popular local services. Finally,
whereas existing research has stressed the negative impacts of ethnic diver-
sity on attitudes toward tax compliance, the findings here stress the poten-
tial for diversity among elites to strengthen tax enforcement by fragmenting
elite resistance.
The importance of these lessons does not lie only in supporting improved
revenue collection. A growing literature has stressed the potential role of tax
reform in promoting reciprocity, bargaining and the construction of local-
level accountability; or, more simply, as an entry point for realizing the pro-
mised governance benefits of decentralization. However, in practice the
strengthening of local government tax collection has advanced very slowly
across African countries despite the expansion of de jure decentralization.
Against this background, experiences in Bo in particular speak to the poten-
tial for achieving both significant revenue gains and the broader expansion
of more contractual forms of taxation. This success has been based not on a
highly sophisticated and technocratic tax reform programme, but on a sim-
plified and locally appropriate set of strategies. In turn, this article points
toward the value of reform that seek explicitly to address political barriers
through, among other strategies, partnering with committed local leaders,
confronting and fragmenting elite resistance, establishing clear fiscal
incentives for local government tax collection, and stressing transparency,
equity, and inclusion – including clear links between local revenue and
expenditure – in order to build a base of popular support for sustainable
reform.
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